Unintended population consequences of policies stem from three sources: (1) A policy overshoots its original goal; (2) different policies conflict, so that the implementation of one policy inhibits implementation of another policy; (3) negative consequences of a policy are unforeseen, or are anticipated but judged unlikely to be severe or considered less important than the positive aims of the policy. Examples from Singapore, South Africa, Italy, the U.S., and the former Soviet Union are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses three sources of unintended population consequences of policies. First, a policy can be more effective than anticipated and overshoot its original goal. After that, reversing the earlier trend can be very difficult. Second, there can be a conflict between different policies. The implementation of one policy can make it impossible or difficult to achieve the goals of another policy. Sometimes this inherent conflict is recognized, but at other times it goes unrecognized for a long time. Third, there can be unintended negative consequences of a policy, although the consequences could have been anticipated. Examples of each of these kinds of unintended consequences are discussed and some overall implications for policy and demographic change are examined. 
OVERSHOOTING OF GOALS AND INEXACT TARGETING
In the 1960s and 1970s many less-developed countries implemented policies designed to reduce fertility. It is impossible to overshoot a goal in a mortality reduction policy, since lower mortality is virtually always considered desirable, but it can be easy to overshoot a fertility reduction goal, since the goal is not ever-lower fertility but usually a fertility level that, in combination with mortality, yields a low but positive population growth rate.
When fertility threatens to fall below replacement level, policies are often implemented to increase fertility. Sometimes the goal is to increase fertility among all segments of the population, but at times a general pronatalist policy is too blunt an instrument. This can happen when the state wants to encourage childbearing among the highly educated, among members of a particular ethnic group, or among people in a particular region of the country. Fine-tuning a pro-natalist policy can be extremely difficult. This section discusses policies to reduce fertility in Singapore, followed by policies to increase fertility in Singapore, especially among ethnic Chinese and among highly educated women.
When a policy overshoots its goals, the result is not completely unintended, since this result was always a possible outcome of the policy. In this case, the consequences were only unintended in the sense that when the fertility reduction policies were implemented, the government did not anticipate needing to implement a pro-natalist policy after only a few years.
Fertility Policies in Singapore Since 1966
Fertility in Singapore began to fall in 1957 (Fawcett & Khoo, 1980, p. 554) . In 1966, Singapore implemented policies intended to lower fertility further (Cheung, 1998, p. 155) . The relative success of the fertility reduction program in Singapore, in comparison to programs in other countries with similar goals, has been widely noted (Fawcett & Khoo, 1980; Lee, Alvarez & Palen, 1991; Saw, 1975) . Figure 1 shows the total fertility rate (TFR) 1 in Singapore 1950 -2000 (United Nations, 2001 .
These policies included a large education campaign, with information about contraceptives and about the benefits to the family of having no more than two children. Following Fawcett (1979, pp. 7-9) , there were also five kinds of disincentives to childbearing:
(1) Maternity policies: Fees for pre-natal care and delivery fees increased with parity, while maternity leave was not given for third and later births. There was no delivery fee if the woman was sterilized after delivery;
